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APPELLATE REPLY BRIEF 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. DUTY BY THE BARRIENTOS 
When the Barrientos used the planter area and ditch area at issue as a driveway they 
had a right of way over Provo City owned property which the Barrientos acknowledge 
existed. Brief of Appellee Barrientos p. 4. The Barrietos, however, allege that the right of 
way did not create a duty to care or maintain the area. While they admit that there is a duty 
to maintain and care for the planter area for which they also have a right of way, they allege 
that their duty ends at the curb line since the City has the sole prerogative to construct and 
maintain streets, curbs and gutters. Appellant disagrees and maintains that the right of way 
creates a common law duty which is not altered by statutory or other Utah or Provo City law. 
1. Right of Ways Are a Type of Easement 
Right of ways are a type of easement and the rights and duties of the Barrientos are 
subject to the principles that govern the scope of easements. Sierra Club v. Hodel 848 F.2d 
1068 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing J. Cribbett, Principles of the Law of Property at 273-74 
(1962). Under common law, it is well established that the easement holder has the duty to 
maintain the easement in a condition for which the easement holder intends to use it. 
Thompson on Real Property v. II, p. 666. 
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The duty to maintain [the easement] so that it may be enjoyed rests upon those 
entitled to its enjoyment, in the absence of some contractual or prescriptive relation 
imposing this duty upon the owner of the servient estate." 
Nielson v. Sandberg. 105 Utah 93, 141 P.2d 696 (Utah 1943). "He thai hath the use of a thing 
ought to repair it." Thompson at 670. If the character of the easement is such that failure to keep it 
in repair will result in injury to a third party, the owner of the easement will be liable for the injury 
caused. Id. at 673. 
Even though Provo City owns the property and has a statutory duty to maintain the streets 
for safe travel for the public, prior rulings of the Utah Supreme Court indicate that the common law 
rule regarding the duty of the easement holder still applies. A case in point is Conrad v. Walker 
Bank & Trust Co., 542 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1975), where the Utah Supreme Court held the Bank 
responsible for failing to maintain their right of way on the planter area owned by the City. 
While Conrad can be interpreted as creating a duty when a person cares and maintains a 
property not their own, it can also be read as supporting the common law rule that a duty 
arises when someone asserts their right of way over another's property. The latter 
interpretation is consistent with prior ruling by the Utah courts regarding easements. 
2. Statutory Law Does Not Alter the Common Law Regarding Easements 
Utah and Provo City statutory law does not alter the common law duty of the 
easement holder but rather supports it. Provo City Ordinances 15.10.050-15.10.090 describe 
a delicate balance of duties between the owners of adjacent properties and the City in regards 
to driveways and gutter areas. The owner is to seek permission before construction of a curb 
or gutter for making a driveway. The owner is to construct the driveway in a way specified 
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by the City. The City is to have procedures in place to oversee these areas so as to protect 
their property and ensure that the improvements do not pose a hazard to the public. Either 
the City or the adjacent owner can request a repair or replacement of a curb or gutter and the 
costs of the improvements depend on the benefit to the public or to the adjacent landowner. 
These ordinances follow the reasoning of the common law and common sense that if 
someone is using another's property for their own benefit, they should be responsible to 
maintain it for that purpose. 
While is it the sole prerogative of the City to determine the necessity and extent of 
construction, extraordinary repairs or replacement for work that the City does, they are not 
the only ones to decide whether or not a driveway should be placed on a property. They 
cannot force a landowner to construct a driveway. The landowner also has a decision 
whether he/she wishes to use a particular area for that purpose. Once a decision has been 
made, Provo City Ordinances explain the balancing of these responsibility to finance, 
construct and maintain the driveway which requires both to do their part to ensure the safety 
of the area for others. 
It is consistent with Utah law, Provo City Ordinances and common law that the 
Barrientos have a duty which runs with the right of way, to use and maintain that area in a 
non negligent manner. 
B. DUTY OWED BY PROVO CITY 
Provo City claims that they do not have an affirmative duty to cover the ditch or 
require the owner to do so. They allege that they have met their duty of due care by 
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constructing the gutter area appropriately. They also claim that they have no duty to 
members of the public who deviate from the street or sidewalk and exit over a ditch. Provo 
City may also be claiming, although it is unclear, that the Appellant fell on private property, 
not City-owned property. 
1. Provo City's Duty of Due Care Included a Duty of Reasonable 
Oversight for Use of the Driveway 
Appellant is not claiming that the gutter was defective in its construction or that the 
construction had deteriorated so that it was now hazardous. Appellant claims that the hazard 
arises because of the open ditch at the end of the gutter. Appellant alleges that Provo City's 
duty was not limited to the construction or maintenance of the gutter structure itself. The 
duty of due care includes a duty to make sure the Barrientos exercise their right of way on 
city property in an non negligent manner. 
Appellant would agree that the City would not be negligence for merely anyone 
exiting any part of any planter area onto the street who falls in a properly constructed and 
maintained gutter area. Provo City Ordinances themselves indicate when the duty of due 
care arises in situations such as the one at issue. 
Provo City Ordinance 15.10.090 sets out the conditions for the City to consider 
regarding construction, repair of replacement of gutters which shall include "(2)(d) a finding 
that the condition of the sidewalk, curb or gutter is hazardous for anticipated users thereof." 
The duty for the City arises when (1) a condition is known to be hazardous and (2) it is 
anticipated that the area will be used. 
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The first step in creating a duty presupposed that the City has knowledge of the 
condition. Provo City alleges that they do not recognize the area at issue as a driveway. The 
Barrientos admit it was a driveway. The pictures show it looks like a driveway. It is paved 
and follows around the Barrientos business. The Appellant and his wife reasonably assumed 
it was a driveway as have truck drivers and business customers. Short of having a sign 
stating that it is a driveway, all other indications show it was. If it looks like a driveway and 
acts like a driveway, it is a driveway whether or not the City has papers on file to say it is 
legally there. 
The next step in creating an affirmative duty to act is to determine whether the area 
is hazardous. In other words, is the condition creating an unreasonable risk of harm; the key 
word being "unreasonable." As Provo City has indicated, there are many areas where there 
is a risk of harm. Anyone stepping off a curb risks harm. A duty arises when the risk is 
unreasonable which would take into consideration factors such as the expense of repair, the 
balancing of the amount of danger to the public versus cost and/or ease of removing the risk. 
These conditions should be given to a jury to consider and determine if the risks were 
unreasonable and therefore hazardous to the public. 
The last step in creating a duty on the part of Provo City is whether the users are 
anticipated, or is use of the area for travel by the pubic foreseeable. Appellant is not 
claiming that the City must ensure that all ends of driveways within city limits are safely 
constructed and maintained. Appellant is asking that all the factors of this particular case 
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be weighed by a jury to determine whether Provo City acted reasonably with regards to this 
particular downtown business driveway. A jury should weigh the evidence presented that the 
driveway is used in a business, the business is a short walk from city hall and is frequented 
by Provo City employees, that the City twice removed a temporary culvert, and that the 
business is in the downtown area. A reasonable juror could then determine that (1) there was 
a business driveway (2) with an the open ditch which created an unreasonably hazardous 
condition and (3) it was foreseeable that the public would use the area for travel. Once it has 
been established that a duty arises, a jury could then determine whether there was a breach 
of that duty. 
2. Appellant Was In the Normal Course of Public Travel 
Provo City alleges that the Appellant deviated from the normal course of travel and 
therefore under Herndon v. Salt Lake City 95, P. 646 (Utah 1907), they have no duty to 
Appellant. They claim that Appellant could have travel over a covered ditch on a nearby 
sidewalk. Whether or not it would have been more prudent for the Appellant to use that 
culvert goes to the issue of possible contributory negligence. It does not affect Appellant's 
legal right to use the driveway area. "When a street is opened and public travel invited 
thereon it must be made reasonably safe for such travel over the portions that are opened and 
set apart for that purpose." Herndon v. Salt Lake City, 95 P. at 646 (Utah 1907). The public, 
which includes the Appellant, does have the right to travel on the ends of driveways to enter 
the street. It is foreseeable that the public, including bicyclists, will exit the sidewalk and 
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driveway into the street. Appellant had a right to be in that area and had not deviated from 
the normal course of public travel. 
3. Provo City Owned the Property At Issue 
Provo City might be claiming that the Appellant fell on private property, however, 
sufficient evidence was produced to show that the fall occurred in the gutter area which is 
on City owned property. That the Appellant had been riding down the driveway prior to the 
fall is irrelevant to the issue of duty of the landowners. 
4. Provo City Assumed Responsibility for the Oversight of Construction 
and Maintenance Over the Gutter Area 
Provo City has assumed responsibility for the oversight of construction and 
maintenance of driveways. 1995 Provo City Ordinances 15.10.050. The City has the 
nondelegable duty to keep the streets, sidewalk and access to them safe for public travel. In 
other words, even though others may have duties to construct and maintain the area safely, 
the City is never "off the hook." They remain the ultimate responsible party to ensure the 
laws are being enforced and that the area does not pose an unnecessary risk of harm to others. 
As described above, the law creates a delicate balancing of duties and responsibilities 
between and owner of land and an easement owner, in this case, the City and the Barrientos. 
This balancing is necessary as some uses of the land benefit one party or the other or benefits 
both simultaneously. A driveway is primarily for the landowner however the public has the 
right to use the end of the driveway for access to the road. The streets must be maintained 
safely but that does not mean an adjacent landowner would not be allowed access to the 
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roadway merely because it would be safer without the driveway. 
In balancing these purposes, Provo City law allows driveways to be bu '^lt but requires 
permission to construct a driveway and specifies how the driveway should f built in order 
to fulfill Provo City's duty to the public to keep the area safe. The Utah legislature has given 
them the tools to enforce compliance should the landowner fail to follow the law. U.C.A. 
§72-7-104. A reasonable juror could determine that the City's failure to ensure compliance 
to the law was a breach of their duty. 
C. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED FOR A REASONABLE 
JUROR TO FIND A BREACH OF DUTY OF BOTH DEFENDANTS 
Defendants claim that Appellant did not produce evidence to show negligence. 
Whether a reasonable juror could find a breach of duty depends on the duty owed. As was 
show above, both defendants had a duty to Ted Rose. The Barrientos were to use and 
maintain the driveway in a non negligent manner; Provo City was to oversee and ensure that 
the Barrientos use of the driveway area was safe for the public. 
A reasonable juror could view the photographs, testimony of the witnesses and other 
uncontroverted evidence which shows the ditch area was uncovered al the time of Ted Rose' 
fall. With the evidence presented, a reasonable juror could determine that the area where 
the fall occurred is at the end of a business driveway and that the Banientos knew or should 
have known the area was uncovered. A reasonable juror could determine that an uncovered 
ditch at the end of a business driveway creates an unreasonable risk of harm to travelers. A 
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reasonable juror could find that the City had notice of this condition. Uncontested evidence 
was presented to show that the City did not take any action to ensure the gutter area was 
covered or that the Barrientos were told to discontinue use of the driveway until it was 
property approved and constructed. Sufficient evidence was provided whereby a reasonable 
juror could determine that both defendants breached their duty. 
D. APPELLANT WAS REQUIRED TO SHOW AN UNREASONABLE 
RISK OF HARM EXISTED, NOT THAT A DANGEROUS 
CONDITION EXISTED 
Defendants claimed that Appellant was required to bring forth evidence that there was 
an unreasonably dangerous condition. An "unreasonably dangerous condition" is an element 
of a strict liability theory but is not part of the prima facia case in a negligence cause of 
action. Instead, Appellant had to bring forth sufficient evidence that "an unreasonable risk 
of harm existed." Appellant alleges that sufficient evidence was presented for a jury to 
determine that the risk to Ted Rose was unreasonable. 
E. PROXIMATE CAUSATION IS A MATTER FOR THE JURY 
Defendants claim that the proximate cause of the Appellant's fall was his lack of 
proper lookout, not the negligence of the defendants. As was pointed out in Appellant's 
Brief, evidence exists which shows that Ted Rose may have acted with due care in his 
approach to the ditch area. The area was shady and when he looked down the driveway it 
appeared safe. He could reasonably rely that the street was safe. "[Wjhen there is doubt 
about the existence of proximate cause and negligence, it should be resolved by allowing the 
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case to go to trial. Questions relating to negligence and proximate cause are generally for the 
fact-trier, court or jury, to determine." MacKay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp. 995 P.2d 1233 (Utah 
2000) citing Rees v. Albertson 's Inc. 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978). 
CONCLUSION 
Sufficient evidence was presented to show that the Barrientos knew or should have 
known that an open ditch at the end of their driveway created an unreasonable risk of harm. 
Since they had a right of way over that area and a duty to maintain that area in a non 
negligent manner, a reasonable juror could determine that their failure to cover the ditch, 
and/or warn of the danger, or take other reasonable steps to remove the unreasonable risk was 
a breach of their duty. That duty ran to the Appellant who was a member of the public. A 
reasonable juror could determine that the Barreintos did not act reasonably when they 
allowed the gutter to remain uncovered at the end of their business driveway and that their 
negligence in doing so was a proximate cause of the Appellant's fall. 
Sufficient evidence was presented where a reasonable juror could determine that 
Provo City had actual or constructive notice that the area was being used as a driveway and 
knew or should have known that the ditch was uncovered. A reasonable juror could 
determine that their failure to contact the owner regarding the ditch was unreasonable 




Appellant alleges that the granting of the directed verdicts was prejudicial error and 
therefore, Appellant requests this Court grant a new trial. 
DATED this 25th day of July, 2002. 
Flickinger & Sutterfield, P.C. 
7 
Kathleen S. Phinney / ' 
Kevin J. Sutterfield ( 
3000 North University Ave! #300 
Provo, UT 84604 
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